2.19 RT – Logic in Late Antiquity and Early Byzantium

In his esteemed philosophical treatise Dialectica, John of Damascus (7th–8th century) reiterates the Aristotelian contention that logic constitutes merely an instrument (organon) of philosophy, rather than a philosophical discipline in its own right. By contrast, in his Encomium to St Gregory the Theologian, composed in the latter half of the ninth century, Nicetas David of Paphlagonia asserts that logic occupies a central position within the philosophical enterprise. This revaluation of logic’s epistemological status emerges as a commonplace within the intellectual milieu of late ninth-century Byzantium. What accounts for this paradigmatic shift in the conceptualisation of logic? How might it be situated within the broader trajectory of early Byzantine logical inquiry? Furthermore, to what extent can this transformation be attributed to the influence of extra-Byzantine traditions of logical education—particularly those cultivated in Armenian, Syriac, and Arabic intellectual contexts? Additionally, how did theological polemics with Manichaeans, Miaphysites, and Muslims shape or recalibrate the study and application of logic within Byzantine thought? This round table seeks to address these questions by exploring the development of logic from Late Antiquity through the early Byzantine period. Contributors will examine diverse dimensions of the multifaceted and hitherto underexplored logical discourse of early Byzantium. Particular attention will be given to the reception and adaptation of Late Antique logical models, as well as to emerging indications that logic had begun to assume novel methodological functions within philosophical and theological frameworks. Drawing upon intertextual analysis, the discussion will also outline the contours of a prospective research agenda dedicated to the study of early Byzantine logic.