Mimēsis in Byzantine Rhetorical Theory after Iconoclasm

Mimēsis, as a rhetorical and literary concept, has enjoyed a long presence in rhetorical treatises, but has also seen shifts in meaning. In its archaic sense, mimēsis represents an “enactment,” by a choral leader, of a divinity in a given role; in archaic poetry, it was used to mean a rhapsode impersonating the composer-poet as he performed epic. In the influential texts of Plato and Aristotle, the concept changes its focus away from the enactment and toward what is being enacted or represented. Later, mimēsis comes to refer to the conscious study of good literary and rhetorical models, as evident in the critical essays of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, which are very influential on Byzantine rhetorical theory. It is used in the same sense in Phoebammon’s early sixth-century prolegomena to a commentary on Hermogenes’ Peri ideōn. These meanings are not lost in the understanding of mimēsis that emerges in the post-iconoclastic rhetorical theory (and especially not the sense of modelling one’s language on the best of the Attic writers); however, after the ninth century mimēsis acquires an additional dimension that reflects the theological discussions of the preceding century. Here I argue that the notion of iconicity, understood as a proper “impression” that retains an ontological relationship with the prototype, when moved into the medium of rhetorical language, constitutes “good imitation.” As an icon participates in the moral and spiritual qualities of its archetype, so mimēsis comes to signify moral and spiritual congruence with the object of speaking, a sense which is visible in the commentaries on Hermogenes by John of Sardis and, later and more clearly, in the commentary of John Sikeliotes. As such, mimēsis aligns closely with another ancient concept, that of the appropriate (to prepon), which is also reinterpreted to mean either consonance with the moral image of the referent or agreement with its most salient natural qualities.