Byzantine Crisis Management Policy in the Balkans (7th-12th Centuries): Some Preliminary Remarks

Throughout its long history, the Byzantine Empire had many conflicts with other states, nations, and tribes, endured countless incursions and campaigns, and fought numerous battles, many of them in the Balkans. Some of these conflicts, incursions, campaigns and battles ended unfavorably for the Byzantines and led to a crisis regarding the military efficiency of the state, the security of the imperial provinces, and even the safety of the imperial capital itself. Sources report that always during a crisis, the Byzantine government took a certain set of measures in an attempt to contain and resolve it. The focus of the paper will be the analysis of this Byzantine “crisis management” in the Balkans in the period from the 7th to the 12th century, through which the Empire attempted to resolve existing or impending military, but also political, crises. What can be observed from the sources is that the essence of Byzantine management of this type of crisis, its modus operandi, was based on two pillars: the implementation of diplomatic and military means. Depending on the type of crisis, whether it was of a larger or smaller magnitude, such as resolving a conflict with another state, nation or tribe, maintaining the status quo after suffering a catastrophic defeat in a particular battle, or a swift conquest of a city or fortress deep in enemy territory, etc., it depended on when, how and which of these means would be practically used. The measures that the Byzantine government implemented to resolve an existing military or political crisis in the Balkans, which were of a diplomatic and military nature, according to the sources, were able in most cases to achieve the intended goal. However, these same sources point to the fact that their application did not always lead to the resolution of the crisis, in certain situations these measures managed to prolong or deepen it.